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Abstract: In his excellent essay, ‘Nudges in a post-truth world’, Neil Levy argues 
that ‘nudges to reason’, or nudges which aim to make us more receptive to evidence, 
are morally permissible. A strong argument against the moral permissibility of 
nudging is that nudges fail to respect the autonomy of the individuals affected by 
them. Levy argues that nudges to reason do respect individual autonomy, such that 
the standard autonomy objection fails against nudges to reason. In this paper, I 
argue that Levy fails to show that nudges to reason respect individual autonomy.  
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I begin with a statement of the problem [1]. First, according to Levy’s descriptive 
commitment, we live in a ‘post-truth’ era where many political actors, including 
voters and politicians, are unreceptive to evidence against their political views. 
Second, according to Levy’s prescriptive commitment, it would be a good thing if 
political actors were more receptive to evidence against their political views. It 
would, at least, enable people to make more informed political decisions. Third, 
according to our best psychological evidence, when we present people with 
evidence against their deeply-held commitments, this often causes them to hold 
these commitments more firmly. This is called the backfire effect [2,3].   
Here is the problem that Levy addresses: 
(Q) How can we make people more receptive to evidence against their 
political views conditional on the existence of the backfire effect? 
Levy’s aim is to provide an answer to (Q), and explain why his answer is morally 
permissible. In what follows, I first explain Levy’s answer to (Q). I then explain 
Levy’s argument for the moral permissibility of his answer, and argue that his 
argument fails to support its conclusion.  
Levy’s answer to (Q) draws on a mounting body of psychological evidence in favour 
of the claim that the way in which evidence is presented to people affects their 
receptiveness to that evidence [4]. For example, if someone from our own political 
standpoint presents evidence against one of our political beliefs, we are more likely 
to be receptive to this evidence than if someone from a contrary political standpoint 
presents that same evidence. Levy proposes that policymakers should exploit this 
phenomenon. On Levy’s view, policymakers should develop ‘nudge’ policies which 
manipulate the sources through which individuals receive evidence against their 
political beliefs in order to make them more receptive to this evidence.  
What makes nudge policies different from coercive policies is that nudges do not 
limit the set of options available to the agent, but instead exploit known cognitive 
heuristics and biases to present choices in a way that increases the probability of 
the individual choosing an option that is in their best interests [5]. A standard 
example is presenting healthier food at eye-level in a food store to ‘nudge’ 
individuals towards buying healthier foods. Levy’s answer to (Q) achieves two aims: 
first, it encourages individuals to engage with evidence against their political views 
whilst minimising the chances of a backfire effect. Second, it does so in a way that 
does not involve policymakers coercing people to form certain views, as the 
recipients of the nudge are left to make an informed decision on the basis of more, 
and not less evidence.  
I have presented Levy’s answer to (Q). I now explain Levy’s reasons for thinking 
that it would be morally permissible for policymakers to implement these policies. 
A strong argument against the moral permissibility of nudging is that nudges fail 
to respect individual autonomy. The roots of this objection trace back to Kant. The 
basic idea is that individuals are practical reasoners who make decisions based on 
reasons with the aim of satisfying their preferences. The capacity to reason, and to 
act on reasons, seems to demand a kind of respect, according to which individuals 
cannot be used merely as a means to satisfy another’s preferences. It has been 
argued that nudges fail to respect individual autonomy insofar as they exploit our 
cognitive weaknesses to influence our decision, which gives insufficient moral 
weight to our status as practical reasoners. Levy’s argument for the moral 
permissibility of ‘nudges to reason’, that is, nudges which aim to make us more 
receptive to evidence, is that these nudges do respect individual autonomy so 
understood. 
Here is Levy’s argument. Levy first challenges the distinction between our 
‘affective’ and ‘deliberative’ cognitive apparatus. He does this by highlighting the 
role that emotions play in our deliberations: it would be difficult for us to make 
decisions in the absence of heuristics and biases. Levy goes on to argue that our 
heuristics and biases plausibly evolved to enable better, more truth conducive 
decision-making. As such, it is false to say that nudges to reason bypass our 
deliberative mechanisms in order to influence our beliefs. The affective mechanisms 
‘exploited’ by nudges to reason are just as much a part of our deliberative 
mechanisms as our ‘cognitive’ decision-making apparatus. On these grounds, Levy 
claims that nudges to reason are more accurately construed as an appeal to our 
deliberative faculties, as opposed to an attempt to subvert them. Levy concludes 
that nudges to reason do not, therefore, fail to respect individual autonomy.  
I believe that Levy’s argument is unsuccessful: he does not establish that nudges to 
reason respect individual autonomy. In short, his mistake is this. It is true that the 
autonomy objection to nudging is sometimes reliant on the claim that nudges 
subvert an individual’s deliberative apparatus. But this is only used as evidence for 
the claim that nudges involve a kind of deceit which is morally inappropriate given 
the kind of respect which is owed to practical reasoners. Levy might be correct that 
nudges to reason do not subvert an individual’s deliberative cognitive mechanisms. 
But it does not follow that nudges to reason do not deceive individuals in the 
relevant sense. It is possible to deceive an agent in a morally inappropriate way 
even if the deceit does not subvert the agent’s deliberative mechanisms. For 
example, suppose you must choose between A or B. There are exactly two pieces of 
evidence relevant to your decision, call them E1 and E2. Suppose you would have 
overriding reasons to choose A if you knew about exactly one of E1 or E2, but 
decisive reasons to choose B if you knew about both E1 and E2. If I omit to tell you 
about exactly one piece of evidence before you make the decision, then I have 
deceived you in a way that shows insufficient respect to your status as a practical 
reasoner. But I did not subvert your deliberative mechanisms. I exploited them so 
that you would choose A over B. Thus, even if Levy is correct that nudges to reason 
do not bypass an individual’s cognitive mechanisms, it does not follow that nudges 
to reason respect individual autonomy.  
Even if Levy’s argument fails, it remains to be shown that nudges to reason actually 
do deceive individuals in a way which fails to respect their autonomy. I shall offer 
some brief motivation for this point. Let us suppose that a newspaper, N, from a 
political standpoint, S, is legally required to publish at least some arguments in 
favour of policies grounded in a different political standpoint, not-S. It strikes me 
that such a policy fails to respect the reader’s autonomy in the following respect: 
according to the Kantian considerations that motivate the autonomy objection, we 
ought to treat the readers of N as though they have weighed-up the relevant 
epistemic reasons in favour of and against reading N, and chosen to take N as their 
source of political information for good reasons. To implement a policy which 
requires the newspaper to present evidence in favour of some opposing political 
standpoint, not-S, with the aim of making the readers receptive to other sources of 
evidence, fails to take seriously those readers as individuals capable of making 
informed decisions about which political evidence they give most weight to. In 
essence, the failure to respect autonomy lies in the assumption that but for the 
nudge, the reader would be incapable of making an informed judgement about 
which information sources she has best epistemic reason to use. 
Levy might respond that we have good empirical evidence in favour of the 
conclusion that many newspaper readers do not weigh-up the epistemic reasons for 
and against using their preferred newspaper as a source of pollical information. But 
the autonomy objection is concerned with how individuals ought to be treated in 
virtue of their capability to act as practical reasoners. The fact that individuals are 
not responsive to reasons in all cases does not undermine the moral importance of 
treating them as if they had considered all the relevant epistemic considerations.  
In conclusion, Levy argues that nudges to reason are morally permissible because 
they respect individual autonomy. I have argued that this is untrue: nudges to 
reason do not respect individual autonomy.  
 
Bibliography 
[1] Levy, N. Nudges in a post-truth world. J Med Ethics 2017; 43:495-500. 
[2] Nyhan B, Reifler J, Richey S, et al. Effective messages in vaccine promotion: a 
randomized trial. Pediatrics 2014; 133:e835–42. 
[3] Nyhan B, Reifler J. Does correcting myths about the flu vaccine work? An 
experimental evaluation of the effects of corrective information. Vaccine 2015; 
33:459–64. 
[4] Harris P. Trusting what you’re told: how children learn from others. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012 
[5] Thaler HT, Sunstein CR. Nudge. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2008. 
 
